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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ll & R SUPPLY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J. M. BRINGHURST and 
LEO BRINGHURST, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
12805 
The facts as stated in the Appellants' Brief are 
substantially correct, but additional facts should be re-
viewed to get a full and accurate picture. 
In examining the exhibits (pp. 9-15; Exhibits A 
through J of Record) it will be noticed that the first 
purchases of plumbing supplies on open account were 
made by LSB (the initials of Appellant Leo Bring-
1 
hurst). The subsequent purchases were made by the 
employ:ees of the appellants who were journeymen 
plumbers and had the authority to pick up and receive 
the supplies or purchase them on open account. 
POINT I 
THE EMPLOYEES OF THE APPELLANTS 
HAD APPARENT AND IMPLIED AUTHOR-
ITY TO BIND THEIR PRINCIPAL TO THE 
INVOICE AGREEMENT FOR PAYMENT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN COL-
LECTING THE PAST DUE PURCHASE 
PRICES OF THE PLUMBING SUPPLIES. 
ARGUMENT 
In Farm & Auto Supply, an Arizona corporation, 
doing business as Farm Service & Auto Supply, et al, 
v. Phoenix Fuel Company, Inc., an Arizona corpora-
tion, 103 Arix. 344, 442 p2d ( 1968), the Supreme Court 
of Arizona, it is stated: 
"we hold that where none of the invoices con-
taining provisions in regards to attorney's fees 
were signed by the buyer and it is not proved 
that the employees who signed the invoices had 
authority to make such an agreement in regard 
1 
to attorney's fees, the mere signing by such 
employees of such invoices does not constitu~e 
a binding contract for the buyer to pay attorneys 
fees as provided in the invoices." 
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The facts in this case were very similar to the 
facts we have before us and the issue to be determined 
by the Court was whether the buyer was liable for 
attorney fees where seller had agreed to sell merchan-
dise on credit. The distinguishing point in the Arizona 
case is that none of the invoices were signed by the 
buyer, only the buyer's agent. 
In the facts we have before us, we have invoices 
representing purchases made by the Appellant buyers 
in the approximate sum of $500.00 and there is no 
doubt that they would be responsible for attorney fees 
on these invoices. The appellants have admitted that 
their employees, who were journeymen plumbers, had 
the authority to pick up and receive the supplies or 
purchase them on open account. Since many of the first 
purchases were made by the Appellants themselves, it 
would be logical for the respondent to rely on the Ap-
pellant's agents to buy on credit and to bind their 
principals to pay reasonable attorney fees if they de-
faulted on the agreement. 
It is stated in 2 Corpus Juris Secundum, Agency, 
§114, the following: 
"An agent whose employment is only for the 
making of a specific purchase, or is specifically 
restricted to purchases for cash, or otherwise 
excludes by its terms any power to buy on credit, 
may not, in the absence of anything to give rise 
to an implication or appearance of a broader 
authority, buy upon any other terms than cash 
payment at the time of the sale; hence the rule 
has been laid down that a mere agency to pur-
3 
chase does not imply authority to pledge the 
principal's credit for purchases made; and, a 
fortiori, one who is not an agent at all, or at any 
rate not an agent to purchase, has no power to 
buy on credit. An agent whose authority derives 
from a written agreement to deal only for cash 
has no actual authority to purchase in any other 
manner. 
However, as the power of a general purchas-
ing agent extends in the absence of operative 
restrictions to allow of his purchasing in what-
ever manner and on whatever terms are usual 
and reasonably necessary to the doing of the 
business confided to him, such an agent may or-
dinarily purchase for cash or credit in his dis- ' 
cretion where both methods are commonly used 
in the particular line of business; and the nature 
and character of the service to be rendered by 
the agent will carry with it, as an incident to 
his agency, implied authority to bind the credit 
of his principal whenever purchasing in such a 
fashion is a necessary and appropriate means, 1 
under the circumstances, to accomplish the pur-
poses of the agency, or is the well established 
and customary method of dealing in that con-
nection. A power to purchase on credit is implied 
more readily and upon slighter circumstances 
than is power to borrow or to issue commercial ' 
paper. Whether a general managing or super-
vising agent in charge of a business, for instance, 
has implied authority to purchase stock, sup-
plies, or equipment therefor on the owner's 
credit depends largely on the character and 
necessities of the business and the customs and 
usages relative thereto; whenever it is common 
for one possessed of such a managerial status as 
that in which the agent is placed to make such 
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purchases, he has the requisite authority, and, 
if such contracts are not usual or customary, no 
such authority is to be implied from the position 
of the agent. Where the agent has actual author-
ity to buy on credit, the fact that the principal 
does not know that a particular purchase was 
made by the agent on his credit, or the fact that 
the seller is not informed of the agency except 
by the statement of the agent, is not fatal to 
the validity of the purchase. 
Aside from the agent's actual authority, ex-
press or implied, the rule is well recognized that 
apparent authority to purchase on credit exists 
when the principal by words or conduct repre-
sents to those with whom the agent deals that 
he possesses such power, or acquiesces in his 
exercise of it, and they sell to him with whom 
the agent deals that he possesses such power, 
or acquiesces in his exercise of it, and they sell 
to him with knowledge of, and in reliance on, 
the principal's conduct creating the appearance 
of power. The requisite elements of ostensible 
authority must exist, however, in this as in any 
other case, and hence the apeparance of authority 
to purchase must be found in the principal's acts 
or conduct, not in a mere assumption or assertion 
of power by the agent, and the seller must have 
acted in reliance on such appearance of power." 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellants' employees had the authority to 
pick up and purchase plumbing supplies on open ac-
count, they also had the apparent authority to purchase 
on credit and bind their principal to the terms of the 
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invoice agreement. The Appellants themselves had 
purchased merchandise on open account and had 
entered into the invoice agreement and the Respondent 
relied on their conduct and their employees had the 
same power to purchase plumbing supplies and enter 
into the invoice agreement. Therefore, judgment of 
the District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALAN D. FRANDSEN 
363 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84lll 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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